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Abstract:  5 
The construction of railway turnout entails a complex geometry and multi-disciplinary engineering 6 
science, which makes it one of the most critical railway infrastructures. As such, these characteristics 7 
pose various risks in rail operation. A considerable number of derailment incidents at the turnouts are 8 
reported annually worldwide. Not only do these incidents cause operational downtime and financial 9 
loss, they also give rise to casualties and sometimes loss of life. One of the fundamental reasons for 10 
this may well be the fact that the railway industry pays little attention to the risk elements of railway 11 
turnouts. The paper, as state-of-the-art, provides an overview of how to deal with the many different 12 
risks arising from railway turnout systems by identifying the most/more suitable risk analysis methods 13 
for the systems. In order to do this, a large number of related articles, reports and review papers are 14 
critically analysed by virtue of comparison, experiences and deductions. As a result, various 15 
qualitative and quantitative based risk analysis methods are proposed to fully understand a number of 16 
technical phenomena, e.g. aging, degradation and signalling faults, in a railway turnout system.  17 
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1 Introduction 20 
As an essential feature to enable rail operational flexibility, railway turnouts are special track systems 21 
used to divert a train from a particular direction or a particular track onto other directions or other 22 
tracks. It is a structural grillage system that assembles steel rails, points (or called ‘switches’), 23 
crossings (or called ‘frogs’), steel plates, rubber pads, insulators, fasteners, screw spikes, beam bearers 24 
(either timber, polymer, steel or concrete), ballast and formation. A railway turnout is a must-have 25 
structure in railway corridor whose crossing imparts a significant discontinuity in the rail running 26 
surface. It is important to note that its structure and components pose different risk profiles to railway 27 
operations. High demand in railway operation, the railway operators have to increase the axle load, 28 
traffic density and speed of the operations. The dynamic wheel/rail interaction on such imperfect 29 
contact transfer can cause detrimental impact loads on railway track and its components. The transient 30 
vibration could also affect surrounding building structures. In addition, the large impact emits 31 
disturbing noises to railway neighbours. Railway turnouts are one of the highest percentages 32 
contributing railway infrastructure component failure. 33 
Although the safety of railway systems is relatively high and is continually being improved, a 34 
considerable number of severe accidents still occur globally. The total number of train accidents for 35 
the last five years (2009 to 2014) in the EU has been reported as around 12,000. Derailment is 36 
illustrated to be the most occurring type of accident, accounting for almost 9% of the total [1].  37 
Derailments have been estimated to cost all EU member states more than 200 million Euros annually 38 
[2]. Financial losses frequently result from damage to wagons or railway components or operational 39 
shutdown. In addition to financial losses, even if the number of fatalities and injuries appears low, it 40 
can be said that fatalities still result from extreme disasters, such as the derailment of a fuel wagon at 41 
Viareggio in 2009, causing 34 fatalities. A recent research reveals an average of 3.9 fatalities per year 42 
resulting from various derailing incidents across the EU [3].  43 
Since the author is of the opinion that most derailments occur on turnouts, this paper focuses only on 44 
the hazards involved here and is intended to address almost all types of causes, identifying useful risk 45 
analysis methods for the major problems.  46 
2  Risk and Safety 47 
A railway has very complex geometry as a large number of components interrelate with each other. 48 
Derailment arises mainly from poorly understood railway systems as a result of this complexity [4]. 49 
One of these systems is turnout, which describes a mechanical installation by means of which flanged 50 
vehicles are able to be diverted from one track to another.  51 
As a turnout system is very complex, attention should be paid not only to railway component failures 52 
in the system, but also operational failures, (e.g. train radio communication system failures, 53 
environmental factors (e.g. poor weather conditions) and interaction problems (e.g. searches when 54 
determining the likelihood of any accident in each individual turnout system). This is because each 55 
has a unique technical characteristic. Therefore, it might be said that every turnout has various 56 
different types of potential causes posing risk of derailment regardless of how well they are 57 
constructed, monitored or maintained.  58 
In this circumstance, risk analysis, a significant step in risk management, plays a key role in reducing 59 
or, if possible, eliminating derailments in particular cases. There is a large number of different types 60 
of risk analysis techniques from which to choose, and each might have an advantage over the others in 61 
the railway industry for one reason or another. An analyst should choose a method giving more 62 
realistic outcomes, otherwise, undesired results, loss of time and cost overruns can be expected [5]. 63 
Hence, to fully understand the existing risk at a turnout, it is necessary to identify appropriate types of 64 
risk analysis methods in the railway industry for this intended purpose.  65 
3 Scope, Significance and Originality  66 
A derailment based on component failures might be attributed to link wagon-based components, such 67 
as bearing failures or axle failures caused by loading problems, or any other component of track 68 
geometry. As mechanical design engineering is more interested in this type of cause than is railway 69 
engineering, the paper is limited to just railway component failures, any type of operational failures, 70 
interaction problems, environmental problems and human factors. There is increasing concern in risk 71 
analysis of railway systems as uncertainties cannot always be quantified and especially cannot related 72 
directly to vulnerable assets and components, which is unlike those energy infrastructures with 73 
identifiable failure modes [6 - 9].  The risk and vulnerability arising from the complex nature of 74 
turnout components and assets in various operational environments has thus been evaluated and firstly 75 
highlighted in this paper. The insight into the risk integration and prioritisation can lead to the 76 
development of adaptive measures for maintenance of turnout systems. The suitable methodologies 77 
can be integrated into the design and preparation stages so that the turnout infrastructure resilience can 78 
be economically built in, improving public safety and reliability [9] 79 
4 Risk Management Principles 80 
4.1 Objectives 81 
Risk management might have several purposes, which are grouped into following serving areas [10]; 82 
 A sufficient safety level demonstration through risk analyses 83 
 A basis for risk communication to all stakeholders including public, investors, various railway 84 
companies in project.  85 
 A basis for decision-making helping to balance risks against costs associated with risk 86 
reducing measures. 87 
4.2 Process 88 
In Risk Management in the railways sector, there is a range of terms frequently used to describe a 89 
particular situation or action. The following are some of these terms and their definitions 90 
A hazard is something (e.g. an object, property of a substance, phenomenon or an activity) that can 91 
cause adverse effects [11]. For instance, a sharp blade profile might be termed a hazard since it might 92 
result in derailment and is, therefore, an adverse effect. Thus, hazard identification may be said to be 93 
important in order to minimise or eliminate the adverse consequences of hazard. As for risk, it is 94 
addressed to the chance that a hazard will give rise to an accident, which results in causalities such as 95 
property damage or financial or life loss [12] 96 
An accident is generally regarded as an unwanted event that brings about physical harm to people 97 
(health or life) or damage to property. Although there is a reasonable degree of consensus as to 98 
whether an accident is an unplanned event, the term ‘incident’ is sometimes used to express such 99 
events where no injury occurs [13] However, incidents are generally seen as wake-up calls that could 100 
alert supervisors and employees to risks or hazards that they had previously not considered while risk 101 
is the chance that a hazard will give rise to an accident, which results in causalities such as property 102 
damage or financial or life loss [14]. 103 
The structure of the overall risk management process is illustrated in Fig. 1 [15]. 104 
 105 
 106 
Figure 1 Risk Management Process [15] 107 
 Risk Identification is formalised after any hazard has been identified. Where an identified 108 
hazard is eliminated and/or its consequences are assumed negligible, analysis might be 109 
discontinued.  110 
 Risk Estimation is the result of chosen risk analysis technique. Thus, it is significant to 111 
determine error-free in regards to both the frequency of a hazard event and the severity of 112 
associated consequences. Frequency and severity values are often estimated through either 113 
quantitative or qualitative methods.  114 
1-Risk 
Identification 
2-Risk 
Estimation 
3-Risk 
Evaluation 
4-Risk 
Response 
5-Risk 
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 Risk Evaluation ascertains whether or not risk warrants a response or is acceptable4 . This 115 
stage is conducted using qualitative or quantitative methods, or both.  116 
 Risk Response includes risk avoidance or elimination, retention, transfer and reduction. 117 
 Risk Monitoring reveals whether the responses are performing adequately throughout the 118 
lifecycle of the component, system or activity. 119 
5 Risk Analysis Process and Techniques  120 
5.1 System definition and hazard identification 121 
The overall approach of hazard identification in railway industry is a deductive process by which 122 
possible events are imagined [16]. This process is highly likely to rely on the experience and 123 
qualifications of the analysts [17]. There are a number of possible ways to support the process; 124 
Brainstorming is the simplest way to identify hazards through which a simple list of hazards is 125 
produced. This kind of identification concentrates on identifying imaginable and unimaginable 126 
hazards within the scope of the domain of the particular concept of railway operation or systems [18]. 127 
The new hazard types in railway industry aren’t generally expected to emerge as the industry uses 128 
almost the same systems for a long time and, as a result, has well-known the common types hazards. 129 
One of the reason for this is the industry largely relies on checklists for a particular case. General 130 
experience from various organisation, stakeholders is gathered to build checklists which often consists 131 
of generic hazards or areas where it is particularly significant to pay attention hazards [19].  132 
The two can be combine each other to predict the hazards. This approach is called as what-if, 133 
generation of scenarios. Besides being an informal method for identifying hazards, it might be quite 134 
often used in railway design projects for financial matters rather than accidents [20].   135 
                                                     
4
 Risk tolerance is still a developing area of research in the railway industry. For instance, rails and 
axles are crucial components, since any failure may result in a catastrophic derailment. However, in 
some cases, it can be decided that a risk falls into the unacceptable region, taking into account cost-
benefit analysis. 
The HAZOP methodology (Hazard and Operability Study) is a structured technique of hazard 136 
identification and failure modes, considering deviations applied to predetermined keywords 137 
describing railway components, system, process or operations being performed [21]. 138 
5.2 Risk analyses  139 
5.2.1 Risk matrix 140 
The risk matrix approach is often semi-quantitative and referred to as preliminary risk analysis. The 141 
approach is easy to use and perform properly, provided that the following drawbacks are resolved [22] 142 
 calibration for intended application is required; 143 
 the parameters, such as likelihood and frequency, are based on subjective definitions, which 144 
could result in comprehending complexities; 145 
 the risk results are only reasonable for systems to which the risk matrices can be applied. 146 
In order to properly conduct a risk analysis based on risk matrix, the three steps, Determine the 147 
possible consequences, Likelihood of occurrence and Risk scoring matrix should be followed [23]. 148 
5.2.2 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 149 
This is a qualitative method, due to its inductive nature, which aims to identify potential failure modes 150 
of the components and to analyse the effects of those failure modes in an engineering system [24, 25]. 151 
The system components to analyse individually could be selected according to the degree of disability 152 
of system operation or by accidents with significant external consequences. Whilst a single system 153 
component is considered at a time, the other components are assumed to work at the same time [26]. 154 
As a result, FMEA is asserted as not fit for critical combinations of component failures [27]. 155 
The analysis proceeds as follows: 156 
 Break down the system into independent subsystems; 157 
o Identify the various operational modes for each subsystem, e.g. maintenance 158 
o Determine its configurations when operating in such modes, e.g. a rail-grinder in 159 
progress. 160 
 Compile a suitable table for each subsystem in each of its operational modes. The table 161 
should not neglect any of the subsystem components and include its failure modes and the 162 
effects on the subsystem. 163 
5.2.3 Reliability Block Diagram – RBD 164 
A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a diagrammatic method performing the system availability and 165 
reliability analyses on complex and large systems using block diagrams to show the components (or 166 
failure events) and network relations in the system [28]. 167 
5.2.4 Fault Tree Analysis – FTA 168 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive technique which enables the building of causal relations resulting in 169 
a given undesired event. This analysis approach begins with a defined system failure event and 170 
reveals backward its causes, down to the primary independent faults [29]. FTA concentrates on a 171 
single system failure mode and is able to give qualitative information on how a relevant event may 172 
occur and what consequences this event can cause [30].The steps in fault tree construction are as 173 
follows: 174 
 The selection of the system failure event of interest, known as the top event. The following 175 
event or events is/are considered with regard to its/ their effect on the top event.  176 
 Identification of contributing events, which might directly cause the top event to occur. As 177 
such, four possibilities exist: 178 
o primary failure of the device (e.g. aging, fatigue) 179 
o secondary failure of the device (e.g. earthquake) 180 
o no input to the device 181 
o human error in actuating or installing the device  182 
5.2.5 Event Tree Analysis – ETA 183 
Event Tree analysis (ETA) provides an inductive approach to evaluate the consequences of an 184 
initiating event and the likelihood of each of the possible sequences which may occur [31]. This 185 
approach is constructed using forward logic. The failure, partial failure or success of different systems 186 
and subsystems is often represented by the branch points on the tree structure. 187 
5.2.6  Markov Analysis – MA 188 
Markov analysis is a stochastic technique that enables the computation of the probability of failure or 189 
repair characteristics of individual components in a specific state at a given time [32]. In contrast to 190 
simulation-based analysis, this is a well-suited approach for rare events, and, thus, allows such events 191 
to be analysed within a reasonable amount of time. 192 
MA is based on the Markov Process, a stochastic process governed by transition probabilities. A 193 
Markov Process is characterised by two main concepts: its system and transaction states. The former 194 
constitutes the system at any given moment of time, while the latter governs the changes of a state that 195 
happen within a system. 196 
5.2.7 Hazard Function – HF 197 
It has been seen that Hazard Function (failure rate) can be applied satisfactorily in the railway and 198 
transportation sectors [33]. It is a function showing the probability of railway components, system, 199 
process or operation failure at time `t` given these are functioning up to time `t`. 200 
5.2.8 Bayesian Analysis 201 
The striking difference between Bayesian and frequentist methods is in the definition of probability 202 
[34]. According to a frequentist, probability is considered as a long-run frequency. In other words, it 203 
is asserted that the probability of a fair coin toss landing heads up is half of the whole possibility, 0.5, 204 
in the long run. Conversely, a Bayesian expresses a belief in the degree that the coin lands heads. This 205 
definition of probability is often termed subjective probability. While probability is used by a 206 
frequentist to express the frequency of certain types, which happens over repeated trials, a Bayesian, 207 
in practice, uses it to express belief in a statement about unknown quantities [35].  208 
In Bayes Analysis (BA), when further information is provided, the structure of the model can be 209 
updated [36]. This feature may be helpful, as the statistical uncertainty is largely present and the 210 
amount of available data is sparse. The other advantage of BA is to integrate experimental data with 211 
reliability data at all available levels through Bayes’ theorem [37]. The theorem underlies how to 212 
update beliefs for prior probabilities. 213 
5.2.9 Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation 214 
Monte Carlo (MC) is a problem-solving technique used to understand the impact of risk and 215 
uncertainties by running multiple trial runs, called simulations, using random variables [38]. The 216 
simulations are the process of running a model, aiming to obtain numerical results, numerous times 217 
with a random selection from the input distributions for each variable. The outcomes of these 218 
numerous scenarios might give a most likely case to approximate the probability of certain outcomes, 219 
as well as a statistical distribution to reveal the risk or uncertainty involved [39]. 220 
6 Comparative Evaluations and Discussions 221 
To assess emerging risks in the railway sector, a large number of possible risk analysis methods 222 
applicable for a turnout have been comprehensively reviewed and critically discussed in this paper. 223 
This research is significant and cannot be matched by simple multiple-criterion decision making 224 
framework, without the insights into multi-layer asset vulnerabilities derived from expert opinions. As 225 
some of the methods depend largely on statistical techniques, a set of illustrative examples has been 226 
given to understand their characteristics in order to deal with the variables for analysis. Additionally, 227 
the limitations of the presented methods are discussed through the paper. 228 
One of the problems is that analysis is often of scarce, incomplete or, sometimes even has missing 229 
data [40]. The weakness in building a satisfying database arises mainly from building new lines, the 230 
new materials used in railway tech, and climate and traffic density changes over the years [41]. As a 231 
result, many precise safety estimates for the ensuing years need to be carried out, as many of the 232 
changes mentioned above have already occurred or will.  233 
These changes have been seen to give rise to component failure rates due to lack of precise 234 
maintenance strategies based on insufficient risk analysis techniques. In the case of complex and 235 
sparse data, it is argued that quantitative based methods, e.g. Monte Carlo or Hazard Function, should 236 
be chosen to provide better information of possible risk factors and their consequences [42, 43]. In 237 
contrast to a deterministic approach, the well-built stochastic approaches of MC and HF might allow 238 
railway operators to eliminate undesirable time and financial losses. This is because the probabilistic 239 
component failure models of the MC and HF techniques are entirely appropriate to complex 240 
engineering systems such as switch blade of a turnout. The blade mechanism often requires an intense 241 
care and maintenance as its geometry generally tends to be changed in use.  242 
Furthermore, a recent study [44] has illustrated that such methods have another advantage over others 243 
for any type of infrastructure, particularly large scale systems, man-made, networked and operated 244 
from long distance, since their results provide much more solid information on total system 245 
vulnerability as a function of the input variables.  246 
Considering the above papers and their conclusions, their methods could be well-adapted into any risk 247 
analysis attempt at understanding to what degree each component of a turnout system could have an 248 
effect on the safe passage of wagons through the turnout. This kind of research should be directed at 249 
optimising the maintenance intervals of system components in a particular type of the turnout. 250 
Considering how different is each response to safety failures, consequently contributing to the overall 251 
system vulnerability of the turnout, stochastic modelling using one of the two approaches is likely to 252 
suit.  253 
However, the core problem of object-oriented modelling for complex engineering systems is related 254 
to slow simulation speed and the large number of input parameters [45]. Additionally, the authors 255 
prescribe that the sub-systems of a turnout should be taken into specific account in the railway 256 
industry risk management chain. Instead, the industry currently often prefers to accept the system as 257 
whole or simply classify it as crossing and switch [46]. From this perspective, these kinds of 258 
classifications make investigating risks and vulnerabilities inadequate and they need to evolve to 259 
approach sound estimates. Such an evolution would be able to take measures against risk and 260 
vulnerabilities due to a better understanding of how these arise in the complexity of turnout systems. 261 
The importance of ensuring how accurate and appropriate data are collected is vital. Given the 262 
subsystem levels of a railway turnout as the aim of the risk assessment study, it is expected to have 263 
two possible sources of data which might be used for the assessment: 1) data through the analysis of 264 
similar railway systems, such as crossing, and then allocation/contribution of failures to the 265 
subsystems of a turnout, and 2) data through elements and components of the subsystems of a turnout 266 
[47]. The latter is known as the bottom-up approach, while the former is the top-down approach. It is 267 
significant to underline that this classification is based, not on the organisation of the data, but the 268 
source of the data.  269 
A failure to display signals at a turnout is a good example of this as the top-event probability in a fault 270 
tree model. If the logical aggregate of turnout subsystems related to signalling process estimates a 271 
failure, then it should be considered a bottom-up approach. On the other hand, if a failure to display 272 
signals is based on observation, e.g. the identification of procedural faults, and if the basic event 273 
probabilities, e.g. human-oriented operational failure of signalling, are the sole allocation of top-event 274 
probability based on various criteria, then the same FT model would be considered a top-down 275 
approach.  276 
The results of these two approaches are highly likely to vary in the same study. Effort in deciding the 277 
structure of the study could be unrealistic. ASA`s recent study of a complex engineering system [47] 278 
revealed that a sound estimation might be achieved with the application of both to a study, and then 279 
the aggregate of the study outcomes and overall failure probability can be reached using techniques 280 
such as Monte Carlo.  281 
Expert review is still one of the essential elements in understanding risk components in railway 282 
studies [48]. In the literature, it is noticed that over 500 railway review-based risk analysis or 283 
management articles, reports and conference proceedings appear to have been published since 2010.  284 
The implementation of expert review into risk analysis is often quite difficult, or even impossible in 285 
some cases [49], e.g. hazard function. On the contrary, more simple methods, such as FMEA, FTA or 286 
risk matrix could be more suitable to review implementation [50]. Furthermore, the majority of these 287 
methods are generally designed with a top-down approach. It is also important to choose methods for 288 
eliciting and aggregating expert opinion. The elicitation and aggregation processes of expert 289 
assessments are classified into two groups: behavioural and mathematical approaches [51]. The 290 
former aims to produce some type of group consensus among experts, while the latter is performed by 291 
the decision maker using a set of mathematical methods.  292 
In 2004, a research study based on the review implications provided solid information as to what 293 
aggregation techniques are effective in satisfying outcomes, by investigating 90 studies in different 294 
fields [52]. However, the results show that there seems to be no prominent all-purpose aggregation 295 
method for expert opinion, even if mathematical methods of aggregation, e.g. Bayes, often yield better 296 
results than behavioural methods.  297 
One of the suitable methods for expert reviews, risk matrix is one of the common methods for risk 298 
assessment and risk classification in the railway domain, e.g. BS EN 50126-1:1999; BS EN 50126-2, 299 
2007; BS ISO/IEC 26702, 2007. However, the technique has some concerns regarding [53-55]: 300 
 calibration to the particular application, 301 
 the dependence of results on the system level to which it is applied, 302 
 vulnerability on the determination of parameter classes, 303 
 challenges of directly taking barriers or risk reduction factors into account in the risk matrix. 304 
On the other hand, the risk matrix is a well-accepted and easy-to-use tool, and can be useful for risk 305 
prioritisation, allowing these problems to be eliminated [56-57]. The elimination can be made through 306 
combination with another method which could additionally take into account the effect of barriers and 307 
their related risk reduction [58-59]. One of the most prominent candidates for combination is FTA, as 308 
used by risk priority numbers in the railway domain. Indeed, risk matrix has lost its reliability because 309 
accessible and improved large railway databases enable the performing of well-built sensitive 310 
quantitative analysis. A study of train control systems has been conducted for a comparison of risk 311 
matrix with a set of risk analysis methods, including semi quantitative (upgraded risk matrix methods) 312 
and quantitative [60]. Although the results of a basic risk matrix are seen to be unrealistic in regards to 313 
safety estimation, a proposed semi-quantitative method alongside the use of risk matrix is determined 314 
as the best approach. However, the research might be considered as incomplete and open to criticism, 315 
considering it does not include FTA-based or any advanced qualitative techniques, e.g. Bayes, in 316 
comparison. In the case of such a comparison, the paper is highly likely to have given a different 317 
conclusion. 318 
 319 
 320 
Figure 2 Overview of the combination model [61] 321 
Figure 2 shows the overall approach, jointly with additional and alternative steps. As seen in the 322 
figure, when barriers cannot adequately be evaluated by score tables, FTA can be added into the chain 323 
to determine what is needed, e.g. safety requirement in this case. Therefore, the final output comprises 324 
the assumptions on which the analysis rests, which may result in SAR (safety-related application 325 
rules) and HR (hazard rates) related to the functional failures (as hazards) of the technical system. 326 
Some methods take proactively preventative measures, whereas others, e.g. ETA, do not. For 327 
instance, the focus of FTA is on provision against multiple causes leading to a number of undesired 328 
events. In other words, the events are likely to occur in the future and the probability of their 329 
occurrences is assumed to be reduced through FTA. On the other hand, the focus of ETA could be on 330 
mitigation measures leading to multiple consequences after any event occurs. Hence, the use of failure 331 
tracing methods is widely different from one to the other, since actions are taken either actively or 332 
proactively.  333 
In fact, the two are complementary and are generally used together by focusing on opposite sides of 334 
an undesired event. 335 
 336 
Figure 3 Bow-tie technique 337 
The figure above shows how they fit together. This is often called the bow-tie technique. Only a 338 
single ‘undesired event’ is shown in the figure; in the reality of the railway sector, multiple causes are 339 
highly likely to result in many different events, initially, each then escalating with multiple 340 
consequences. Each event can be analysed through FTA and ETA. In a nutshell, ETA is interested in 341 
stopping an event escalating, whereas FTA is concerned with analysing faults which could lead to it 342 
happening. Both can be applied qualitatively or, if data are available and satisfying, quantitatively.  343 
The bow-tie could be used successfully to access the adequacy of controls and identify areas for risk 344 
reduction in properly operating railway turnouts. The aim could be to test the robustness and number 345 
of existing safeguards and identify improvements.  346 
For instance, the technique might be useful for risk assessment of driver-to-signaller train radio 347 
communication system failures which are responsible for derailments at the turnouts, as stated in the 348 
second section. It inherently has a graphical representation, which might result in easy understanding 349 
of the relationships between the causes of unwanted events and their control. The assessment is highly 350 
likely to identify procedural controls, along with integrity and functional requirements, and establish 351 
issues requiring information, assessment or action where the effectiveness of a control might be 352 
questioned.  353 
However, the bow-tie might not be the panacea for all risk management problems. If a particular level 354 
of risk is required to be revealed in absolute terms, the technique might not help directly. Similarly, 355 
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there could be better ways than using bow-ties to model the complex interrelationship between risk 356 
controls.  357 
Additionally, there is another issue for classical risk analysis methods, e.g. FTA and ETA, typically 358 
decomposing a system into subsystems and basic elements. Investigating risks for a turnout system 359 
with strong interdependencies in nature has to go beyond the convention cause–consequence analysis 360 
in order to concentrate on spill-over clusters of failures. Indeed, the sum of the behaviour of 361 
individual components in a turnout cannot be expected to describe implicitly the behaviour of the 362 
whole system. This renders questionable the suitability of such risk analysis techniques. Moreover, 363 
pre-defined causal chains, e.g. defined by ETA, are likely to be inappropriate to identify hidden risks.  364 
It is ultimately worth noting that each technique might provide different parameters or outputs that 365 
may be particularly useful regarding intended solutions of the problem. Therefore, a risk analysis 366 
method should be chosen, not only based on hazard, but also the consideration of the capabilities of 367 
each technique.  368 
As a summary of outputs, desired outputs can be simple lists of individual failures (FMEA, RM), 369 
numerical estimates of system failure probabilities (MA, RBD, FTA), listings of event scenarios and 370 
their likelihoods (ETA), numerical system failure probabilities and sensitivities to input variables 371 
(BA, MC), or unique combinations resulting from a combination of these methods (e.g. use of both 372 
FTA and ETA).  373 
As regards successful application of compressive risk analysis methods, British boards, e.g. London 374 
Underground Board (LUB) and The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), appear to be very 375 
successful and, in 2015, were ranked top among the EU-25 countries across all state-specific national 376 
reference values [62].  377 
Using a good example of bow-tie techniques, London Underground Board and the UK national 378 
railway network currently rely on their own risk models, namely the LUQRA (London Underground 379 
Quantitative Risk Assessment) and the RSSB SRM (Safety Risk Model), respectively. The general 380 
common purposes of the models are, briefly: assessment of risk and risks of change, understanding 381 
current risks, identification of mitigation measures and key risk contributors and risk-based 382 
improvement planning [63-64]. The main difference between the two is that the LUQRA is designed 383 
by considering more serious injury and fatality relative to minor injuries. 384 
In contrast to using the same structured model with bow-tie techniques, their judgements are different 385 
to each other. For instance, both the RSSB and the LU use separate fault/event tree models for 386 
derailment at various different speeds. Other situations affecting the results, e.g. how far the derailed 387 
train moves away from the centre of the track or how many people there are on the derailed train, are 388 
considered through the ET model, which means there are many approximations and assumptions 389 
made by different analysts in terms of the points of detail which are less or more important for 390 
accident consequences [65]. 391 
Additionally, despite the models being at system levels, the LUQRA quantifies first at the system and 392 
then at line-level, considering line-specific factors, and, lastly, aggregates the line representations of 393 
risk to the overall system representation, whereas the other begins with the whole system 394 
representation and then disaggregates it to reach risk representations for individual routes [66-68]. 395 
The models take into account: train accidents, including collusion and derailment, movement 396 
accidents, including various interfacing problems, and other malicious non-movement accidents. 397 
However, the RSSB SRM does not inherently include accidents most seen in underground lines, such 398 
as flooding and arching, whereas the LUQRA does.  399 
Furthermore, the data used by the both models, is: 1) derived from historic data; 2) normalised per 400 
relevant unit of railway activity; 3) evaluated to make a decision on whether changes in the railway or 401 
its operation may have influenced the normalised rate of occurrence of such events; and 4) multiple 402 
backups of current relevant volumes concerning railway activity to achieve the best estimation of 403 
forecasting the frequency of such an event today. However, in the RSSB SRM, database updates are 404 
carried out more often and its database covers a shorter time period.  405 
Upon the request of the Office of Rail Regulation in the UK, a report [65] has been published to 406 
reveal the one closest to reality through comparison of the general nature of the outputs, produced by 407 
both models, using recent actual safety performance. The outputs of the models in the report covers: 408 
1) top event frequencies and annual risks, 2) probability/consequence of top event outcomes, 3) 409 
frequencies/number curves.  410 
Comparison between the actual experience of recent years and the current risk model predictions 411 
shows that the LU QRA`s average estimates for five years from 2006-2007 to 2010-11 are somewhat 412 
higher than the reality. The LU QRA predicts about an average six passenger fatalities per year for the 413 
events, while the RSSB SRM estimates an average of around 11. However, the actual average 414 
numbers per year for the LU QRA and the RSSB SRM are 0.8 for LU and 6.8 for National Rail, 415 
respectively. This pessimistic attribute of the LU QRA can be explained by: 1) risk models of 416 
included top events not having been updated for some time; 2) the statistical data applied in 417 
quantifying the model being derived from longer time periods than tend to be used by RSSB; 3) 418 
beginning with a picture of the whole system and then disaggregating it, which could be somehow 419 
more beneficial for complex scenarios.  420 
On the other hand, both models provide a distorted picture of risk, mainly arising from the following 421 
concerns: 1) incompleteness – leaving out rare but significant events previously experienced in the 422 
UK; 2) limited database - using only own database; 3) backward looking - addressing only past events 423 
rather than predicting and integrating current underlying risk; 4) uncalibrated process - leading to 424 
under-estimating or consistently over-estimating safety risks. 425 
To address these in turn: where the models might be incomplete and limited, global events can be 426 
incorporated into their database with proper modelling to obtain UK-appropriate estimates of 427 
frequencies and consequences. As regards backward looking, the models make an assessment of risk, 428 
doing a scale up/down of current incident rates through multiplication of current activity volumes 429 
with recent normalised rates. Although RSSB might occasionally make changes to the recently 430 
observed rate, both may need to identify the sensitivity of risk to various aspects of safety 431 
performance improvement in accordance with their activities. As regards the data calibration of the 432 
models, the LU might err on the side of pessimism in its risk estimates, as smaller units of railway 433 
increase the areas where the model could tend towards using longer term incident data. 434 
All the methods to use in a railway turnout system are evaluated in the following table [69-72]; 435 
Technique 
Life cycle 
phases 
Strengths Weakness 
Availability 
prediction 
Common 
cause 
failures 
Effects of 
uncertainty 
in data 
Proactive 
use 
RM All phases Quick preparation; 
suitable in the case of 
subjective data, e.g. 
expert opinion on only 
ties degradation of a 
turnout.  
Inadequate for 
complex systems; cannot 
identify 
dependencies such as 
signalling errors.  
Yes No No Yes 
FMEA After 
design is 
finalised. 
good for identifying 
single point failures. e.g. 
electrification process of a 
switch mechanism.  
Human error not addressed; 
unable to reflect system 
redundancies, interactions, 
and Common Cause 
Failures. 
No No No Yes 
RBD Throughout 
life part. 
Design 
phase. 
As for FTA As for FTA Yes Yes No No 
ETA All phases 
 
Excellent tool to model 
temporal escalation of 
events such as high speed 
based derailment; ideally 
suited to model efficiency 
of safety critical tasks and 
emergency response; 
provides numerical 
estimate of likelihood of 
an escalated event such as 
operational faults; 
Dependencies highly on the 
correct capture of event 
escalation; needs scarce data 
for such complex systems as 
aging any railway 
components through FTA. 
No Yes Yes Yes 
MA Essentially, 
design 
stages 
Good for complex 
systems; good tool for 
identifying process 
inefficiencies. 
Unable to reflect 
redundancies and 
Common cause failures. 
Yes Depends 
on model 
Yes No 
HF Design of 
emergency  
Preparedne
ss plans 
Very thorough 
Technique: evaluates 
existing safeguards and 
identifies ultimate 
For a human-based failures, 
Quantification may be 
misleading since such 
failures are quite difficult to 
Yes Depends 
on model 
Yes Yes 
and 
evaluation 
of safety 
critical 
tasks 
consequences. May be 
good tool to arrive safety-
based maintenance model 
of a turnout.  
model; due to its reliance on 
scarce date to model, 
gathering of data might be 
difficult. 
MC To 
establish 
properly 
reliability 
of system, 
ideally 
during 
consolidate
d design, 
but could 
be used in 
all phases 
 
Once model built, input 
distributions are quickly 
updated to yield new 
results; an Intuitive 
process, helping users to 
add some qualitative data 
into a mathematical 
model which describes 
the risk parameter; 
provides a range of 
consequences, enabling 
better estimation of risk. 
 
Creation of a mathematical 
model can be challenging; 
relies on computerised 
methods, e.g. spread 
sheeting; satisfaction of the 
analysis highly depending 
on complexity.  
 
Depends on 
model 
Depends 
on model 
Yes Yes 
FTA Throughout 
all stages 
of 
operation. 
May be excellent for 
complex systems where 
interaction and 
combination of events and 
failure needs to be 
considered; uses properly 
statistical data of 
component failures of a 
turnout to evaluate 
probability for unwanted 
top event; provides visual 
model of a safety system; 
provides ranked lists of 
critical turnout 
components; an excellent 
tool based on a qualitative 
or quantitative application 
to model redundancies 
and fault tolerance 
(vulnerability). 
In spite of Databases 
unsuitable for specific 
application, e.g. Aging of 
rail track, failure 
information might be 
supported using FORM 
methods; unable to model 
temporal events of a turnout 
such as changing weather 
conditions. Dependencies on 
correct capture of faults and 
failure mechanisms and 
interaction to predict system 
behaviour. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 436 
 437 
 438 
7 Concluding Remark 439 
Railway turnout is a complex system, which is used to divert a train from one track to another. Its 440 
geometry and gradient constraints make it one of the most critical railway infrastructures. Significant 441 
complexity of railway turnout results in emerging risks during rail operations. This has been proven 442 
by a large number of train derailments at or nearby railway turnouts and crossings. Such incidents 443 
cause operational downtime and financial losses, and sometimes the loss of lives. The proper 444 
estimation of the high level of risk posed by railway turnout systems is essential for companies and 445 
organisations in order to operate the entire railway system without any safety concerns. With the 446 
increasing interest in railway transportation, the risk in railway turnout systems as a most problematic 447 
one, one which might be expected to increase and require more complex analysis.  448 
This review paper assists in evaluating the existing understanding and practices of risk analysis and 449 
modelling, and in revealing the gaps in the industry. It has been seen that the industry uses a wide 450 
range of risk analysis modelling and gains different outcomes. Research showed that railway industry 451 
needs to pay special attention to monitor and manage interconnected risks, in order to improve public 452 
safety and operational reliability. The paper thus presents the state-of-the-art risk management 453 
techniques considering systems thinking approach, diversity of emerging risks and variety of risk 454 
analysis methodologies. Comparative evaluation of the techniques has been comprehensively 455 
discussed with relation to railway incidents. The practical guidelines have been summarised for 456 
railway practitioners so that risk management processes can be enhanced for rail transport with 457 
special respect to railway switches and crossings. As a complex system, a railway turnout is evaluated 458 
to be appropriately fitted for downward models. Furthermore, it has been found out that there are 459 
many problems updating existing risk levels and model calibration. Solutions to these, such as 460 
integration of databases, calibration, etc. can be recommended, but their impacts and significance 461 
require further research.  462 
There is no question that risk analysing, modelling and management of railway systems provide an 463 
invaluable tool for railway companies and organisations to forecast various scenarios and then 464 
minimise their effects. Addressing areas arising from the discussions, the following might be 465 
underlined as envisaged to be worth future development.  466 
 The benefits of greater ability to select, evaluate and discuss relevant aspects of risk analysis 467 
modelling to meet suitable safety criteria of railway turnout systems, e.g. using a continuous 468 
updating process whereby a large number of outputs in each particular case is obtained by 469 
using many different methods and inputs, and then comparing the outputs with reality 470 
annually to optimise and calibrate the expectation.  471 
 The reaction of more integrated environments for different risk analysis; the different levels 472 
of various risk factors, such as railway components aging and environmental-based, can be 473 
integrated with each other to forecast more accurately the likelihood of occurrence at turnout 474 
systems, thereby revealing the quantitative relation between them. In this example, the 475 
integration of both factors might lead to different risk levels, even across the same railway 476 
line, which might provide a better understanding of the real level of risk rather than levelling 477 
out the overall risk.  478 
 The outcomes of building more effective databases. Where any discovered new events are 479 
expected to occur and data are incomplete, as often seen following technology transfers, it 480 
might be better to incorporate the external data into the existing models with proper 481 
modelling to derive UK-appropriate estimates of frequencies and consequences. 482 
 The effect of the same detailed Mapping Top Events of estimations throughout the industry, 483 
i.e. any hazard on one side can, in some cases, be subdivided into more than one category on 484 
the other. Standardised titles and subtitles might be beneficial to approximate accurate risk 485 
levels in a particular case.  486 
 Various quantitative cost-benefit optimisations of all those points above to learn what needs 487 
to be extended. 488 
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